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Executive Summary:

Northeast Missouri’s Public
Health Response to COVID-19
Spring 2022

The Public Health Response to COVID-19 in the Northeast
Region of Missouri is one of three regional reports that
offers findings from conversations with local stakeholders
and residents about their experience with the state and
regional pandemic response. The study focused on the
period from March 2020 through May 2021, just prior
to the surge caused by the delta variant and well before
the emergence of the omicron variant. Its aim is to document efforts by Northeast Missouri’s local public health
agencies (LPHAs) and a multitude of other stakeholders
to combat COVID-19, and to identify lessons that could
strengthen public health practices to better safeguard
communities in the future.
Missouri’s approach to public health is decentralized, and
as such LPHAs were tasked with tapping local, regional,
and state relationships and resources to wage a locally
tailored response to a global virus. Uneven resources and
a varied approach challenged pandemic response coordination, both regionally and across the state, despite
enormous dedication by local public health; state and
local elected officials; health care organizations; first
responders; community non-profits; and countless others.
Northeast Missouri’s 16 LPHAs (defined using the boundaries of Highway Patrol Region B1), like those across the
state, have been chronically underfunded compared to

departments in other states. Years of underinvestment
in local public health departments took an enormous
toll on staff, operations, and all other aspects of LPHAs’
response to COVID-19. Some LPHAs had reserves they
had built over a period of years that could be tapped
for a major scale-up in workforce and other needed
areas. Other LPHAs had little or no rainy-day funds
and depended heavily on Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act (CARES Act) funding to bridge
their funding gaps. In the absence of CARES Act funding or reserves, LPHAs maintained services to the best
of their ability, which often was not sufficient to muster
a robust pandemic response and maintain traditional
public health programs designed to help those most
in need in their communities.
Our hope is that the following key study findings will be
leveraged to strengthen the public health system’s ability
to continue responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, and
to face future crises with greater resources, coordination,
equitable strategies, modernized infrastructure, and
public trust. Because Missouri is a large and diverse
state, we also acknowledge there is no single pandemic
story. Experiences and events of the crisis — including
the speed of the virus’s spread, how infection impacted
populations, and how local authorities and stakeholders
responded — differed from region to region.

1 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services divides its health reporting regions according to the Missouri State Highway
Patrol map. To view the regional map, see https://health.mo.gov/data/gis/pdf/map_ReportingRegions.pdf.
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Readers therefore may also be interested in the companion reports, The Public Health Response to COVID-19
in the Southwest Region of Missouri 2 and The Public
Health Response to COVID-19 in the St. Louis Region
of Missouri.3 Findings from the three reports were used
to inform the state-level recommendations in our report

Missouri’s Public Health Response to COVID-19: Key
Findings and Recommendations for State Action and
Investment, which was developed for the purpose of
strengthening the state public health system’s ability to
face future crises, and to capitalize on new and timely federal funding opportunities in the wake of the pandemic.4

2 Trott, J., Mead, K., Benoit, M., Hughes, D., Levi, J., Baños, J., Seyoum, S., and Regenstein, M. “The Public Health Response to
COVID-19 in the Southwest Region of Missouri” (2022). Health Policy and Management Issue Briefs.
https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_policy_missouri/
3 Regenstein, M., Mead, K., Trott, J., Seyoum, S., Baños, J., Van Bronkhorst, H., Benoit, M., and Hughes, D. “The Public Health
Response to COVID-19 in the St. Louis Region of Missouri” (2022). Health Policy and Management Issue Briefs.
https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_policy_missouri/
4 Levi, J., Regenstein, M., Hughes, D., Trott, J., Markus, A., Seyoum, S., Acosta, A., Benoit, M., Van Bronkhorst, H., Conway, C.
“Missouri’s Public Health Response to COVID-19: Key Findings and Recommendations for State Action and Investment”.
(September 2021). Health Policy and Management Issue Briefs. Paper 61. https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_policy_briefs/61

KEY FINDINGS: NORTHEAST MISSOURI’S PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO COVID-19

Key Finding

A

Prior Public Health
Emergency Response and
Preparedness Was an Asset
During the Pandemic

Summary
LPHAs’ prior experience with public health emergencies, including H1N1 and flu
outbreaks resulted in preparedness planning and relationships that helped to facilitate
pandemic response efforts. However, some LPHAs felt caught off guard when the
state diverged from public health emergency plans previously put in place and
instead positioned health care entities to lead key efforts like vaccine distribution.
Stakeholders noted limited community-based training and preparation for infectiousdisease outbreaks in comparison to natural disaster and bioterrorism preparation.

B

Regional Partnerships and
Resource Sharing Were
Critical to the Pandemic
Response

The Northeast’s rural geography necessitated collaboration and resource sharing.
The Northeast’s 16 LPHAs leveraged a pre-existing, longstanding model of shared
staffing and resources to navigate logistics when executing complex pandemic
response activities like mass vaccination. Regional partnership was a hallmark of
the pandemic response.
To compensate for the public health system’s limited human and financial
resources, other sectors also stepped in to conduct and support myriad COVID-19
response activities, and in some cases took a leadership role. A multi-sector
approach helped increase access to testing in the region.

C

LPHA Staffing and
Resource Constraints
Profoundly Limited the
Effectiveness of the
Pandemic Response

Even with strong local and regional partnerships, small health departments
with limited staffing and resources struggled to keep pace with the speed and
magnitude of the pandemic. LPHAs stretched and repurposed staff, and paused
other public health services. Many tapped financial reserves, contract funds, and
CARES Act funds from their county to shore up resources, but funding was often
insufficient. Contact tracing was particularly burdensome for LPHAs and staffing
needs were difficult to predict. Residents were empathetic to the constraints faced
by health departments and were appreciative of their efforts.
Health care organizations lent their capacity and resources to support key
response efforts in the region like testing and vaccine distribution. Schools also
assisted with contact tracing efforts.

The Public Health Response to COVID-19 in the Northeast Region of Missouri
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D

Poor Coordination with
the State Weakened the
Region’s Response

Stakeholders across the Northeast region appreciated that the pandemic response
was tailored to community needs. However, as LPHAs faced an onslaught of
questions about the novel virus and their decision making, stakeholders and residents
alike desired clearer state-level guidance to inform decisions at the local level.
There was occasional confusion about the authority LPHAs had to implement
pandemic-related public health measures. Mitigation strategies and protocols
were used inconsistently across the region, undermining their value. LPHA staff
sometimes faced vitriol from community members over public health measures.

E

F

Inconsistent Data
Reporting and Outdated
IT Systems Stymied Timely
Decision Making

LPHAs relied on their own systems for tracking cases during the early months
of the pandemic. These systems were variable in quality and for some health
departments included paper-based files and disease tracking methods.

Trusted Information
Sources Enhanced
Communication Efforts but
Contended with Rampant
Misinformation

Public messaging campaigns were used in lieu of mandated mitigation measures
in most areas of the Northeast. Multi-sector involvement in delivering public health
messaging was viewed as a success, and was most impactful when trusted voices
in the community were used and the messaging met people “where they were at.”

Due to reliance on antigen testing in rural areas, LPHA case reporting was
inconsistent with the state, which did not report antigen test results in the early
months of the pandemic. This eroded public trust in the data. New case tracking
systems were introduced by the state late in the pandemic, adding to LPHAs’
burden, but also creating some new efficiencies. Stakeholders recommended
modernization of technological services as a means to move public health forward.

Social media was viewed as a double-edged sword – transmitting both crucial
information as well as propagating dangerous myths about the virus, most notably
about the vaccine. A number of residents felt that clear, consistent messaging,
including an explanation of the creation of the vaccine from start to finish, could
have facilitated the public’s trust and understanding in COVID-19 prevention and
mitigation strategies.
Focus group residents expressed trust and confidence in their local public health
officials. They cited strong leadership, community relationships, transparency, and
political impartiality as important factors for building trust.

G

The Public Health
Response Did Not
Sufficiently Meet the
Needs of Older Adults and
Individuals Living in Poverty

Poverty is a critical issue in Northeast Missouri with most counties exceeding
the state’s average poverty rate of 12.9%. LPHAs and other stakeholders noted
that low-income and older adults in the Northeast struggled to obtain essential
pandemic services due to cost, transportation, and digital access issues. Some
regional efforts focused on providing transportation and registration assistance
to older adults and low-income residents to ensure their access to testing and
vaccination services. Cost of testing was also a barrier to its use.
Students in low-income households, and those living in remote and rural
communities, struggled in the transition to remote learning. The cost associated
with technological supplies and unreliable internet access in rural communities
hindered students’ ability to consistently participate in online learning.

H
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Public Health Messaging
Was Not Tailored to Latino,
Black, and Immigrant
Communities

Language barriers and lack of culturally tailored education about the pandemic
hindered efforts to reach people of color living in the Northeast. Some residents
noted that better outcomes might have been achieved had information been
translated and better targeted to meet the needs of Black, Hispanic/Latino, and
immigrant communities.

The Public Health Response to COVID-19 in the Northeast Region of Missouri

Study Approach
and Methods
In summer 2020, Missouri Foundation for Health contracted with The George
Washington University Milken Institute School of Public Health to assess Missouri’s public health preparedness and response capacities to the COVID-19
pandemic and future public health crises. The purpose of the regional case
studies is to 1) document the multi-level and multi-stakeholder efforts to combat
COVID-19 and 2) identify lessons from the pandemic that could strengthen
public health practices to better safeguard communities in the future.
In the Northeast region, which is designated Region B by Missouri DHSS (see
Figure 2), we spoke candidly with 25 professional stakeholders in various counties and towns (see the types of stakeholders we interviewed in Appendix A,
Table A). Our sample included stakeholders within and outside the field of public
health, including schools, health care, the business community, policymakers,
and social service organizations. Our interviews began in October 2020 and
concluded in May 2021, prior to the surge caused by the delta variant. We
promised confidentiality and anonymity to study participants to encourage
candor when recounting their perspectives and professional experiences.
We refer to this group throughout the report as stakeholders.
We also conducted 11 focus groups and two one-on-one interviews with people
living in the Northeast region to examine public perceptions of the pandemic
response. We refer to this group throughout the report as focus group residents
or participants. We spoke with a total of 56 residents during spring 2021. Table
B in Appendix A provides information on the characteristics of the focus group
participants. One limitation of our study is that our sample of residents consisted
of individuals who were well-informed about and interested in discussing the
Northeast region’s response to COVID-19. They were also generally supportive of public health’s role in helping to stop the spread of the virus. As such,
they provided thoughtful and reasoned input on the public health response in
Missouri; however, we acknowledge that our sample does not represent large
groups of residents who favored a limited role for public health and other
government organizations with respect to the COVID-19 response.
Our interviews with stakeholders and focus group discussions with residents
were supplemented by media accounts and other publicly available data sources.
For more information on the study methodology see Appendix A.

How the COVID-19
Pandemic Unfolded in
Northeast Missouri
March 2020 – May 2021

We knew it was a SARS-type event similar to what had happened in the past, so
[there was] not a lot of great emphasis from state or federal level, or sense of
urgency by anyone, by any means — until we got our first case in the state of
Missouri, on March the 7th. And then all hell broke loose.
– LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH STAKEHOLDER

In order to understand the COVID-19 response in Northeast Missouri, it is important to first know the manner
and context in which the virus impacted the region and
its residents over the time of the case study, from March
2020 through May 2021.
As COVID-19 infiltrated the urban areas of Missouri in
early March, LPHAs in the Northeast corner of the state
cautiously monitored the virus from afar. On March 13,
2020, Governor Parson declared a state of emergency
— months before some counties in the Northeast region

would even report their first cases.5 The brunt of the
pandemic was slow to impact the rural and sparsely populated communities that make up much of the Northeast,
providing the region’s LPHAs, hospitals, and emergency
response services with a window of opportunity to ready
a response (see Figure 1).
By early April 2020, Governor Parson implemented a
statewide stay-at-home order placing limits on building
capacity and non-essential travel.6 Northeast communities were generally receptive to early measures taken

5 Missouri Secretary of State. Executive Order 20-02. (2020, March 13). https://www.sos.mo.gov/library/reference/orders/2020/eo2
6 Missouri Governor Michael L. Parson. Stay at home order. (2020, April 3). https://governor.mo.gov/press-releases/archive/governor-parson-issues-statewide-stay-home-missouri-order-control-contain
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FIGURE 1. WEEKLY AND CUMULATIVE COVID-19 CASES FOR NORTHEAST MISSOURI,
Weekly and Cumulative PCR Confirmed COVID-19 Cases: MSHP Troop
MARCH 2020 – NOVEMBER 2021
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This graph represents weekly and cumulative PCR confirmed COVID-19 cases for Highway Patrol Region B.
SOURCE: Missouri Hospital Association analysis of MO DHSS EpiTrax data, Mar. 10, 2020 – Nov. 30, 2021.

by businesses and public venues to limit capacity or
temporarily close. However, as Governor Parson lifted
a month long stay-at-home order on May 4, 2020,7
many Northeast Missourians were enthused to return
to routine social and economic activities. Rural communities continued to be reassured by relatively low case
rates, apart from scattered outbreaks such as the one
at the Kirksville-based Kraft Heinz food plant.8 With
few exceptions, most communities in the Northeast
never returned to the restrictions seen in the first two
months of the pandemic, with much public sentiment
pointing toward the “natural social distancing” that a

rural region afforded. Across the Northeast, only one
county and a handful of schools would pursue mask
mandates during the course of the pandemic, and those
mandates were enacted in some of the most populous
areas in the region.9,10
Accustomed to working collaboratively in the face of
natural disasters and public health emergencies, the
Northeast’s emergency and public health apparatuses
tapped staff and volunteers across county lines to meet
local and regional needs. In early May 2020, the distribution of funds from the CARES Act provided welcome

7 Missouri Governor Michael L. Parson. Extension stay at home order COVID-19. (2020, April 16). https://governor.mo.gov/press-releases/archive/governor-parson-extends-statewide-stay-home-missouri-order-through-may-3
8 Greenstein, M. (2020, May 21). Kirksville bologna factory confirms COVID-19 outbreak. KSHB. https://www.kshb.com/news/coronavirus/kirksville-bologna-factory-confirms-covid-19-outbreak
9 Adair County Mask Ordinance. (2020, November 23). https://adair.lphamo.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/11242020115522.pdf
10 City of Kirksville Mask Ordinance No. 12407. (2020, November 24). https://www.kirksvillecity.com/filestorage/9701/9967/16590/
Face_Covering_Ordinance_12407.pdf
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help to some LPHAs engaged in testing and contact
tracing efforts. However, some county governments
refused to pass the funds on to their LPHAs.11 Without
adequate CARES Act funds, many LPHAs drew upon
their own cash reserves or redirected existing contracts
to cover the costs of COVID-19 staffing and supplies.
Local businesses in the region also received CARES
Act funding to replace lost revenue and support other
COVID-19 related costs.12,13
Summer 2020 brought some areas of the Northeast
their first real spikes in case rates, as the region resumed
daily life and greenlit large events. By July 2020, the
city of Hannibal became a federally designated “Red
Zone.”14 Following July 4th celebrations, DHSS staff
were sent to Macon County to assist with testing due
to continued outbreaks in the region.15 Noting a lack of
public and political support for implementing stringent
public health measures, most LPHAs worked to educate
on mask wearing and social distancing. As summer
progressed, cases accelerated across several counties
in the Northeast.16 School districts, often working with

LPHAs, weighed fall 2020 re-opening decisions and
established mitigation protocols.
Like many areas in Missouri and the US, the Northeast
region experienced one of its worst COVID-19 surges
in fall and winter 2020. The surge stressed local and
regional health care organizations, causing ICU bed
and staffing shortages and challenging LPHAs’ ability
to keep up with contact tracing.17,18 Health care providers and LPHAs brought in volunteers, hired new staff,
and in some cases stretched their existing staff to help
shoulder the burden.
In early January 2021, as the vaccine began rolling out
to the general public, the Northeast’s LPHAs worked
strategically and creatively to secure doses for their
communities. Smaller LPHAs formed partnerships with
hospitals and larger health departments to store vaccines.19,20 Initial demand was high, and the Northeast
quickly became a hub for local residents and others
traveling from far-off urban areas to take advantage of
the efficiently run and well-stocked vaccination events.

11 Moore, K., & Kelly, M. (2020, August 2). Missouri got millions to fight COVID-19, but 50 health agencies haven’t seen a penny.
Kansas City Star. https://www.kansascity.com/news/coronavirus/article244568372.html
12 Hannibal Regional EDC. (2020, July 3). Marion County allocates $2,175,639 for the first round of CARES Act funding award
decisions. https://hredc.com/news/marion-county-allocates-2175639-for-the-first-round-of-cares-act-funding-award-decisions/
13 McDonald, T. (2020, September 3). Collaboration aims to help with utility bills. Hannibal Courier Post. https://www.hannibal.net/
archive/article/collaboration-aims-to-help-with-utility-bills/article_79134cad-a62d-500b-a64d-2cd94a2d5c36.html
14 Nelson, A. (2020, July 30). Missouri elevates to federal “red zone” for coronavirus cases. Missouri Net. https://www.missourinet.
com/2020/07/30/missouri-elevates-to-federal-red-zone-for-coronavirus-cases/
15 Nelson, B. (2020, July 10). State Health Department Staff headed to Macon for mass COVID-19 testing event. The Macon County
Home Press. https://www.maconhomepress.com/articles/2943/view
16 Hannibal Courier-Post. (2020, August 21). COVID increases in Marion, Ralls, Monroe counties. Hannibal Courier-Post.
https://www.hannibal.net/archive/article/covid-increases-in-marion-ralls-monroe-counties/article_3eb4c0df-9cd5-58a1-be0882917f3a6186.html
17 Shorman, J., Ritter, S., & Kelly, M. (2020, November 15). ‘A very dangerous time’: COVID rules return as Kansas, Missouri hospitals
on the brink. The Kansas City Star. https://www.kansascity.com/news/coronavirus/article247174934.html
18 Garlock, J. (2020, November 16). NEMO hospital puts out plea for help from retired healthcare workers amid COVID crisis. KTVO.
https://ktvo.com/news/local/covid-crisis-prompts-nemo-hospital-to-put-out-plea-for-help-from-retired-healthcare-worker
19 McDonald, T. (2021, February 22). Vaccination clinic reflects community teamwork. Hannibal Courier Post. https://www.hannibal.
net/news/local/vaccination-clinic-reflects-community-teamwork/article_5744a69d-bb5f-5c45-a84c-83ee6fcf3c93.html
20 McGee, C. (2021, February 28). Adair County Health Department says mass vaccination event was a huge success. KTVO.
https://ktvo.com/news/local/adair-county-health-department-says-mass-vaccination-event-was-a-huge-succes
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However, demand soon waned. Vaccination rates in the
region proceeded at a pace that underperformed the
national average and expectations, leaving the Northeast
vulnerable to the rapid spread of the delta variant.21,22,23,24
As spring 2021 arrived, optimism about the pandemic’s
outlook increased nationally. Federal health officials
loosened guidance on masking and social distancing
for the vaccinated in June 2021.25 However, after a relatively calm spring, the Northeast saw isolated spikes
in case rates going into summer 2021.26 The Sewershed Surveillance Project detected the delta variant in
wastewater samples in Brookfield, in Linn County, in
late May. Case numbers there soared, with 5% of the
county’s population becoming infected in just 6 weeks.27
A “pandemic of the unvaccinated” ensued as the delta
variant spread, trouncing hopes of the pandemic coming
to a near-term end.

By late August 2021, high case numbers and low hospital capacity tested the region’s LPHAs and health care
providers, who experienced a painful sense of déjà vu.
As a health care stakeholder remarked, “It’s demoralizing to get past a hurdle, only to find the same hurdle
right around the corner.” 28 Since our study ended, the
region has continued to fight the virus, including facing
the emergence of the omicron variant. The past two
years have left many in the public health field feeling
defeated; however, this study comes at an opportune
time to address the long-standing problems and weaknesses that were made so apparent by COVID-19, and
to learn from and invest in the successes of the region’s
pandemic response.

21 Gray, B., Merrilees, A. (2021, March 7). Rural vaccine surpluses around Missouri spark frustration and questions. St. Louis Post
Dispatch. https://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/coronavirus/rural-vaccine-surpluses-around-missouri-spark-frustration-and-questions/article_96c76d86-ccfc-53b9-898a-5ceba944749a.html
22 Missouri COVID-19 vaccine tracker. (2021). Springfield News-Leader. https://data.news-leader.com/covid-19-vaccine-tracker/missouri/29/
23 Christie, A., Brooks, J.T., Hicks, L.A., et al. (2021). Guidance for implementing COVID-19 prevention strategies in the context of
varying community transmission levels and vaccination coverage. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep; 70:1044–1047. DOI: http://dx.
doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7030e2
24 The New York Times. Tracking coronavirus in Missouri: latest map and case count. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/
missouri-covid-cases.html
25 Rabin, RC., Mandavilli, A., Weiland, N. (2021, May 13). Vaccinated Americans may go without masks in most places, federal
officials say. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/health/coronavirus-masks-cdc.html
26 Keller, R., & Weinberg, T. (2021, May 28). COVID surge in north Missouri creates worries for summer as vaccinations decline.
Missouri Independent. https://missouriindependent.com/2021/05/28/covid-surge-in-north-missouri-creates-worries-for-summeras-vaccinations-decline/
27 Lenthang, M. (2021, June 23). Missouri tracks spread of delta variant using wastewater. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/US/
missouri-tracks-spread-delta-variant-wastewater/story?id=78419065
28 Keller, R. (2021, August 28). Missouri ICUs filling as delta variant wave moves into northeast, southeast regions.
Missouri Independent. https://missouriindependent.com/2021/08/28/missouri-icus-filling-as-delta-variant-wave-moves-into-northeast-southeast-regions/
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I. Public Health Infrastructure
in the Northeast
Missouri’s public health system represents a decentralized approach that relies on decision-making at the local
level.29 Sixteen (16) of the state’s 115 local public health
departments are located in counties in the Northeast
region — Region B (see Figure 2). Within the Northeast
region, county health departments are governed by
boards of trustees,30 but each varies in terms of size,
staffing, infrastructure, services, and funding (see Appendix A, Table C). Boards of trustees of local public health
departments raise money for public health through tax
levies that range from $0.09 in Monroe County to $0.30
in Schuyler County.31
The 16 counties in the Northeast are rural, with a median
population of 8,037. Knox is the least populated county
in Region B, with a population of 3,744, and Marion
County is the most populous, with 28,525 residents.
Kirksville (Adair County) and Hannibal (Marion and Ralls
Counties), the two largest cities in the region, are hubs
for health care, employment, and higher education.

Access to the health care safety net is variable in the
Northeast, making the presence of a local public health
department all the more critical. There are five counties in
the region without a hospital or community health center.32
The Northeast region’s population is predominantly
White, with Black populations ranging from 0.1% to
5.6% of residents (see Appendix A, Table C). Hispanic/
Latino and people of other ethnicities also live in this
region, especially where industries such as agriculture
and meat processing employ relatively high numbers
of immigrant workers. Sullivan County, for example, has
a Hispanic/Latino population of 18.6% and is home to
the Smithfield Foods’ pork processing plant. Across
the region, poverty is a critical issue. Fourteen counties
(88%) exceed the state’s average poverty rate of 12.9%.

29 Decentralized local public health governance indicates that local government employees lead local health departments and local
governments have autonomy over fiscal decisions. See, https://www.astho.org/Research/Data-and-Analysis/State-and-Local-Governance-Classification-Tree/.
30 The majority of Missouri LPHAs and all of the LPHAs in Region B operate under a Board of Trustees governance model. The
Board sets policy for the LPHA and is initially appointed by the County Commission, and then elected on a term basis by the
public. Under this model, the Board sets an annual tax levy specifically for public health purposes, that cannot exceed a certain
maximum rate. For more information, see Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Public health works: a web based
orientation manual for public health leaders. (March 2019). https://health.mo.gov/living/lpha/phworks/publichealthworks.pdf.
31 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Public health works: a web-based orientation manual for public health leaders.
(March 2019). https://health.mo.gov/living/lpha/phworks/publichealthworks.pdf
32 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Medical facilities in Missouri. https://arcg.is/01H5L8
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FIGURE 2. MAP OF MISSOURI DHSS HEALTH REPORTING REGIONS: NORTHEAST MISSOURI (REGION B)
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None of the 16 LPHAs in the Northeast are accredited by
either of the two accrediting bodies available to LPHAs
in the state.33,34 The process of accreditation enhances
an LPHA’s ability to respond to public health crises
because it requires a comprehensive review of capacity
and public health processes, including an emphasis on
emergency preparedness. According to a recent capacity

assessment of Missouri’s LPHAs, the cost and time to
pursue accreditation are the two biggest barriers preventing the majority of the state’s LPHAs from pursuing it.35
Like their counterparts in other regions of the state,
Northeast Missouri’s LPHAs have been chronically underfunded36 and thus experience challenges in building

33 The Public Health Accreditation Board (PHAB) is a national organization that sets standards for tribal, state, local and territorial
public health agencies. For more information, see Public Health Accreditation Board. Why become accredited? https://phaboard.
org/why-become-accredited/.
34 The Missouri Institute for Community Health (MICH), is a Missouri-specific and voluntary accreditation for LPHAs that is a lower-cost
option for those seeking accreditation. For more information, see Missouri Institute for Community Health. Accreditation introduction. https://michweb.org/accreditation-introduction/.
35 HealthierMO. (2021, March 13). Report on the capacity of Missouri’s public health system to deliver the Missouri foundational
public health services model. https://82e4c309-d318-40ba-b895-4b0debd596f5.filesusr.com/ugd/9bd019_e1413ba555784d6eb889ca21674fd5ab.pdf
36 Missouri Budget Project. The health of Missouri is at stake. (2016, January 16). https://www.mobudget.org/the-health-of-missouriis-at-stake/
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infrastructure and staff capacity with the diversification of
skills required to address the full range of public health
needs in their communities. The 16 LPHAs that make
up the Northeast Region B’s health reporting district
adopted a “shared services” model where they regularly
share information, resources, and staffing, including
an emergency planner, environmentalists, nurses, and
other specialist staff. This provides enhanced capacity
across health departments, some of which have fewer
than 10 full- and part-time staff members combined.
This network was established well before the COVID-19
pandemic, and these LPHAs leveraged it throughout the
pandemic response.
Funding to meet the needs of the COVID-19 response
was a challenge for LPHAs in the Northeast. Many LPHAs
drew down on their state and local contracts to maintain
revenues to the extent possible. When CARES Act funding became available, LPHAs that received funds were
able to use them to shore up funding gaps.37 However,
these funding avenues did not adequately support both
COVID-19 activities and routine public health programming. Additionally, temporarily scaling up small staffs to
meet the demands of an unpredictable pandemic was a
challenging and financially risky endeavor for Northeast
health departments.

37 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. CARES Act funding toolkit for local governments. https://health.mo.gov/
news/newsitem/uuid/64d61390-482c-4322-b2b7-71d74ba119d7
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II. Strengths and Challenges
in Northeast Missouri’s Public
Health Response to COVID-19
The following sections present key findings related to strengths and challenges identified by
professionals from multiple sectors involved in the pandemic response, as well as residents’
perceptions of the pandemic response.

A. Prior Public Health Emergency Response and
Preparedness Was an Asset During the Pandemic
I think we had planned for a lot of scenarios that are more likely to occur: massive tornadoes,
or something along those lines. This was a different scale. And a lot of our plans were about
action that could be immediately taken, whereas this is a lot about advice coming from multiple different directions and then making a decision really at various different levels to act.
— LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH STAKEHOLDER

Northeast Missouri is versed in emergency planning and
has recent experience flexing its resources to fend off
infectious disease outbreaks. Most notably, in 2009-2010,
when flu cases in Missouri increased 174.5% from the
year prior due to the H1N1 pandemic, state and local
emergency response systems were activated to mount
a response. Health departments in the region launched
public messaging and vaccination efforts targeted to

high-risk groups, including children under 15 years of
age.38 As a result, LPHAs formed and strengthened partnerships with local school districts and other community
agencies. A public health stakeholder recalled: “With
H1N1, it was led by public health from the beginning,
and I just remember that we all had the plans, we used
the plans, the state sent the vaccine, then we distributed
the vaccine through local public health agencies.”

38 Bureau of Communicable Disease Control and Prevention. Communicable disease surveillance 2009 annual report.
https://health.mo.gov/living/healthcondiseases/communicable/communicabledisease/annual09/Annual09.pdf
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In the wake of the H1N1 pandemic, the Northeast
region’s LPHAs continued to play a leading role in annual
flu vaccinations. Many LPHAs felt that the experience of
this earlier pandemic helped with specific aspects of the
COVID-19 response, such as testing, vaccine distribution,
and PPE use. Several local public health departments
described having detailed plans drawn up for vaccination
clinics, such as a location in the community where vaccines could be distributed, lists of volunteers who could
be tapped, and mechanisms for community outreach.
A stakeholder from the business community highlighted
the connection between these flu clinics and well-run
COVID-19 testing and vaccination efforts, stating, “I think
that [distributing flu shots] really set our health department
up well to do the drive-through COVID-19 testing and
then the vaccines.” A number of residents in the focus
groups echoed this sentiment, praising Northeast LPHAs
planning and preparation around the vaccine clinics. One
resident noted, “I was just really impressed with the …
forethought in terms of the things that from most of our
public perception, we just think, ‘Oh good, they’re giving
flu shots,’ when behind the scenes for years, they’ve been
working towards something, if it’s needed.”

“I think that [distributing flu shots]
really set our health department up
well to do the drive-through COVID19 testing and then the vaccines.”
– Business community stakeholder

In addition to prior public health emergency experience,
many of the region’s emergency response stakeholders — including law enforcement agencies, ambulance
districts, fire departments, hospitals, county health
departments, and others — routinely participated in
disaster preparedness meetings, practice runs, and action
and improvement reports for the federal government.
At least one county had an emergency management
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partnership in place between a county health department, city government, and first responders that met
and practiced on a routine basis and created a broad
community emergency plan, which was said to have
been helpful.

Limitations of Emergency Preparedness
and Planning
Several public health stakeholders noted that they were
caught off guard when the state’s COVID-19 emergency
response diverged considerably from plans that had been
put into place following H1N1 and 9/11: “... we’ve had
these emergency preparedness contracts where we’ve
had to develop all of these manuals for mass vaccination,
emergency preparedness. Nobody [at the state] ever
addressed all those plans [during COVID-19] and I don’t
know if it’s because there’s been so much turnover at
the state level … But the plan was gone.” For example,
although LPHAs in the region played an important role
in COVID-19 vaccination efforts, prior plans to have
them lead vaccination distribution never came to fruition. Instead, health care organizations were tapped for
their capacity to lead mass pandemic efforts. One LPHA
stakeholder pointed out: “I think mass vaccines are kind
of our bread and butter and then they were only going
to give us [LPHAs] 3% or whatever of the allocation
for the state. So it’s like, ‘Why?’ I don’t know. I just felt
it was a missed opportunity to really utilize the health
departments in a way that they are already practicing.”
In spite of the many efforts to plan for large-scale emergencies, stakeholders across multiple sectors reported
feeling ill-prepared to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic.
Although there had been at least one communicable
disease simulation in Adair County in 2018, recent community preparedness exercises in the region had been
more focused on disasters and bioterrorism, which one
health care stakeholder remarked, “doesn’t quite prepare
you for something quite like this.”
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B. Regional Partnerships and Resource Sharing
Were Critical to the Pandemic Response
We [collaborate] in our region because we have to and we’ve always
done it that way because it works for us and now everybody else is
like, ‘Oh, yeah. Collaboration. What a brand-new thought.’ Yeah,
not new for us.
— LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH STAKEHOLDER

As COVID-19 moved through Northeast Missouri,
pre-existing community and regional partnerships were
essential to coordinating a flexible pandemic response.
The rural geography of the region presented inherent
challenges in distributing resources and making services
like testing and vaccination easily accessible; many
stakeholders described close and longstanding relationships as essential to addressing these challenges. As
one stakeholder in the education sector put it, “In our
region, it’s a lot of sharing because it’s rural. Everybody
is spread out, but then everybody comes together.”
Pre-pandemic, the 16 LPHAs in Region B met regularly
to collaborate on public health programming and to
share information. Several county health departments
shared staffing, including an emergency planner who
was contracted to serve 10 counties in the Northeast.
One public health stakeholder commended Northeast
LPHAs’ coordination: “We’re kind of unique because
we’re used to not having a lot of resources, so we all
work really well together.” Another stakeholder observed:
“Everything they [LPHAs] have to do is collaborative.

One county can’t handle everything. If somebody is
doing it, everybody will jump in.”
Public health stakeholders expressed pride in their ability
to navigate distribution challenges during the vaccine
rollout due to innovative collaboration across LPHAs
and other health care organizations. The state’s plan,
which relied on “High Throughput Health Centers” to
distribute vaccines regionally,39 posed difficulties for
very rural areas where there were no large health care
organizations nearby to offer vaccines and the population was not sizable enough for individual LPHAs to
meet the minimum order required. One stakeholder
explained: “We only had Pfizer, which was shipped in
large [quantities of] doses. Well, I can probably vaccinate
my whole county with one tray of [Pfizer] vaccines. It was
very difficult when it came in large amounts.” Local public
health departments created a workaround by operating
a rotation system to share and allocate large shipments
of the vaccine, ensuring that each county eventually
obtained sufficient doses for their communities if they
were able to use it.

39 Governor Michael L. Parson. Governor Parson announces high throughput health center COVID-19 vaccine allocations for March
1-14, 2021. (2021, March 1). https://governor.mo.gov/press-releases/archive/governor-parson-announces-high-throughput-healthcenter-covid-19-vaccine
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Multi-Sector Community Partnerships
The health care, education, and business sectors supported pandemic response activities. During the vaccine
rollout, regional hospitals offered their storage capacity by holding several large trays of vaccine for health
departments in other areas of the region, whose staff
would then travel to the hospital to transport smaller,
more manageable volumes back to their counties.
A public health stakeholder explained: “We all got
together with a hospital who had an ultra-cold freezer. We
placed just two large orders and then split them … You
show up, you pick up your vaccine, you put it in the
fridge, and you give it [out] within five days. We did a
lot of that in the early days before health departments
could place orders.” One LPHA used emergency funding
to purchase a freezer to store vaccines, which allowed
earlier access to vaccines and also provided vaccine
storage for other counties.
Many stakeholders, particularly from sectors outside of
public health, stressed that a multi-sector approach was
also pivotal in successfully increasing access to testing,
including free community testing. In late April 2020, Adair
County held one of the first free drive-through testing
events in the region, made possible through a partnership
with Missouri’s DHSS and several local health care organizations.40 The county’s receipt of a rapid, point-of-care
Abbott testing system from the state enabled it to build
up its testing capacity to host testing events with several
community partners, including Northeast Regional Medical
Center, which performed all test processing in-house.41,42

To further increase testing event offerings, DHSS also partnered with health centers in the Northeast by sending them
testing kits and supplies.43 Residents saw the results of these
efforts and a number reported that over time testing availability increased as more sectors got involved and more
sites became available, particularly in the larger counties:
“If you couldn’t get in at the health department, two blocks
away is the doctor’s office … And if that wasn’t working,
[there were] drive-through clinics every day.”
In some cases, sectors outside of public health took the
lead in convening stakeholders. In one county, the school
superintendent set up weekly calls with the local hospital
and community organizations to discuss the COVID19 response. The county’s LPHA was also invited to
these calls. Sectors outside of public health also helped
amplify critical public health messaging about COVID19. For example, a county commissioner convened the
public health department, first responders, health care
workers, education officials, and others to establish
a cohesive community response. A stakeholder from
a community-based organization felt this effort “was
extraordinarily helpful within that county to be able to
do that coordinated effort, and it was from top-down
leadership.” Residents in our focus groups also observed
local public health departments partnering with other
institutions and leading the charge in most cases: “I think
the local public health department is kind of the face,
but I do think they are working with other agencies in
the town, as well, to kind of help at least create more
of a uniform message.”

40 Capuano, A. (2020, April 29). Hundreds tested for COVID-19 at free drive-thru clinic in Adair County. KTVO. https://ktvo.com/
news/local/hundreds-tested-for-covid-19-at-free-drive-through-clinic-in-adair-county
41 Adair County Health Department. Rapid testing for COVID-19 available in Adair County. (2020, April 24). https://adair.lphamo.
org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Rapid-Testing-Adair-County-3-24-20-WEB.pdf
42 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Increased testing capacity allows Missouri to expand criteria for patient testing.
(2020, April 23). https://health.mo.gov/news/newsitem/uuid/912934b4-fa13-408b-a9b7-627db5c1c1e1/increased-testing-capacity-allows-missouri-to-expand-criteria-for-patient-testing
43 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Impact summary. (2020). https://health.mo.gov/living/healthcondiseases/
communicable/novel-coronavirus/pdf/impact-summary-2020.pdf
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C. LPHA Staffing and Resource Constraints Profoundly
Limited the Effectiveness of the Pandemic Response

Our public health safety net system [has] been bleeding out for decades
because it’s funded, under the control of the county, who really don’t
have much knowledge of and shouldn’t really be in control of public
health. I think we need a pretty clear revamp of our public health.
Hopefully everyone understands that public health is very important
just as they recognized many decades ago when they established
the public health departments.
— HEALTH CARE STAKEHOLDER

In spite of the benefits of cross-sector collaboration,
the pandemic often overwhelmed local public health
capacity in the region. Ramping up for response efforts
was difficult given limited staff and resources going into
the pandemic. LPHAs drew upon their financial reserves,
existing contract funds, or CARES Act funding from their
counties to hire additional staff; however, funds were not
always available or sufficient for the level of need. Many
health departments diverted existing staff — including
administrators, accountants, nutritionists, and environmentalists — to COVID-19 testing and contact tracing
functions. Volunteers were sometimes needed to backfill
staff. As the unpredictability of the pandemic became
evident, LPHAs contended with making impossible projections for future staffing needs. One LPHA stakeholder
described the toll of unexpected case surges: “We’d
been three weeks without a case and we had 12 [cases]
in 16 hours, which doesn’t sound like a lot of cases to
big places. But when you have two and a half nurses
who are doing everything else plus COVID, we all felt it.”

Health departments often had to halt routine programs
and services for pandemic response efforts, which
further lowered their revenue streams. As one LPHA
stakeholder explained, “I think, especially being small,
it was kind of pretty bare-bones there for a while … We
paused doing [routine] immunizations because we had
so many cases that we couldn’t keep up with the contact
tracing … I do feel like a lot of our other programming
went to the wayside.”
At times, LPHAs had to curtail their involvement in certain
pandemic activities due to infrastructure and capacity
limits. This was often felt by residents in the area, as
one focus group participant noted about their health
department: “They did not have enough support or
financing … to both man the health department and
do the contact tracing. It was like either/or.” In another
example, an LPHA stakeholder explained that securing
the infrastructure and personnel time for vaccine clinics
was a “financial drag.”
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“They did not have enough support
or financing … to both man the
health department and do the
contact tracing. It was like either/or.”
– Focus group participant

When limited LPHA testing capacity met with the region’s
rural geography, further difficulty ensued, particularly
in low-population areas with few testing sites. A health
department in one county explained: “We could not
get testing up here. We’re too far from everything. Even
when COVID-19 started, there was no testing alternative.” Another health department made the difficult
decision not to take on testing responsibilities in their
community because a hospital was a drivable distance
away: “We just didn’t have the means to do it.” While
rapid testing was thought to be more readily available
and convenient for residents living in more rural areas,
some in our focus groups felt that there was not an adequate supply: “There are not really any [places] around
these rural areas where you can go get rapid testing and
same-day results. Missouri puts out all these different
locations, whether [in] Kansas City and St. Louis, and
they’re in these big cities. Nobody’s going to drive two
hours when they’re not ill to get a rapid test.”
Most health departments eventually leaned on organizations outside of public health to help with efforts.
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Many schools and health care organizations hired their
own contact tracers or used existing staff to support
tracing efforts. One clinical organization, for example,
assigned their human resources staff to contact tracing,
saying that it was “not something you would ever suspect coming into a pandemic, that your HR team would
be bearing the brunt of the burden [of contact tracing],
but it sure was.”
Some focus group residents were keenly aware that
LPHAs were constrained in their response efforts due to
preexisting staffing and funding limitations, particularly
in smaller counties: “They just were overwhelmed when
all of a sudden, they were having to do contact tracing,
and they were trying to organize vaccines. They’re trying
to give information and they were dealing with such a
divided population that was wanting them to do one
thing and then other people wanting them to do another
thing. So they were, I’m sure, at the end of their ropes.”
Even in larger counties, participants saw the impact that
response efforts were having on health departments’
constrained resources, and appreciated the physical
and emotional toll it was taking on staff: “I’d say from
my perspective, they have just been warriors in this from
the very beginning … They have been providing daily
updates on case counts and [they have] a very small staff
who are, I’m sure, completely underpaid and overworked
and exhausted and come under scrutiny and protests.
They have just done an amazing job.”
In sum, public health leaders believed resource sharing
was critical to their response, however the low baseline
funding that Northeast’s health departments faced meant
that they had a depleted arsenal for fighting COVID-19
from the start.
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D. Poor Coordination with the State Weakened
the Region’s Response
I would like to reiterate that Missouri as a whole, I do like that they gave
the decision making — and how each community was going to handle
the spread in their community — to the hands of the locals.
— HEALTH CARE STAKEHOLDER

Most Northeast stakeholders felt that local entities should
have the ability to tailor public health measures to the
community. Even though they were facing a global pandemic, a local approach — versus a statewide, one size
fits all response — was said to be particularly relevant
to the region due to its uniquely rural geography. One
business community stakeholder felt that stringent measures employed in urban areas did not seem applicable
in the Northeast: “We’re in a rural area. We’re socially
distant by design. We have fewer people. And the
lockdowns that were in the St. Louis, Kansas City area,
I don’t think were needed here … We’ve got a school
district in my county that they have maybe eight kids in
the entire class and they’re a K-12 [school]. I think we’re
so different than an urban setting that I like the local
choice better than a statewide thing.”
However, several stakeholders across sectors still took
some exception when it came to what they observed as
“the state’s hands-off approach” in providing clear guidance and public messaging related to the virus, particularly
early on in the pandemic. Despite regular and frequent
communication with the state, several questions from
LPHAs in particular went unanswered during the first year

of the pandemic. One public health stakeholder recounted,
“We met, and continue to meet, weekly with the state, by
way of conference calls, and we still can’t get answers
to a lot of the questions that we have.” Some LPHAs
reported that they felt ill equipped to make decisions on
their own and did not have the bandwidth to research
and implement mitigation policies when the state did not
issue clear guidance: “We don’t have enough information.
We’re building the plane in the air as we fly it.” A public
health stakeholder explained: “[The] phone was ringing
non-stop. It was very trying when it first happened. And
we answered lots of questions. And honestly, I don’t know
if we answered those questions correctly.”

Challenges in Implementing Local
Public Health Response Strategies
In the Northeast region, LPHAs are governed by a board
of trustees whose members are publicly elected and are
under obligation of their County Commission to pass
legislation.44 Occasionally LPHAs found themselves in
disagreement with their boards about mitigation measures that were publicly unpopular, and as a result had to

44 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Public health works: a web-based orientation manual for public health leaders.
(March 2019). https://health.mo.gov/living/lpha/phworks/publichealthworks.pdf
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anticipate and navigate pushback from board members,
other elected officials, and the general public. Some stakeholders reported that public health officials experienced
bullying and personal threats over mitigation measures,
making it challenging for them to do their jobs; some
officials in public health met resistance even from people
with whom they had close, long-standing relationships:
“The mental health [impact] on our workers is unreal
and I’ve had several [health department] administrators
tell me that they’re losing great nurses that have been
there for years because they can’t take it anymore. They
can’t take the verbal abuse they get on the phones from
people that they have to put in quarantine or isolate.”

defined “close contacts” according to CDC guidance
while others shifted toward looser guidance, impacting
which students and staff were required to quarantine
and for how long. In an attempt to reduce the number
of students in quarantine, Governor Parson announced
in November 2020 a plan that included less-restrictive
quarantine protocols than those backed by CDC. This
directive put some LPHAs in a difficult position to either
adjust to the state’s recommendations or keep enforcing
guidance by the CDC.45

Quarantine protocols were
especially scrutinized by parents
and students in several counties,
as CDC and state guidelines
frequently evolved, and were
not always aligned.

Due to public sentiment and the rural nature of the region,
city- and county-wide mask mandates were not common
in the Northeast. Exceptions included Adair County and
the city of Kirksville, where mandates were in place from
November 202046,47 to May 1, 2021.48,49 Additionally,
school districts in three counties pursued mask mandates, and some national business chains had masking
requirements in the area as well. In the few circumstances
where there were mask mandates, stakeholders and
residents pointed to difficulties with enforcement and
adherence. As one resident noted, “I feel like it’s kind
of mixed, going from … campus that’s just fully locked
down, masks in buildings and on the quad … versus
going to Walmart, where masks are required but then
you walk in and there’s nobody wearing them.”

School districts across the region worked with LPHAs
to implement school closure and reopening decisions,
quarantine and isolation protocols, and other mitigation measures. Quarantine protocols were especially
scrutinized by parents and students in several counties,
as CDC and state guidelines frequently evolved, and
were not always aligned. For example, some LPHAs

Some LPHAs were disappointed at not having the state’s
backing and support for mitigation measures and policies
because it led to difficulties with implementation and
enforcement: “I think that the way we [public health]
were portrayed in it as ‘Oh, that’s up to the locals, that’s
a local decision’ ... [But] how do we mandate that?” In
some cases, LPHAs’ authority to enforce public health
measures according to the state statute was unclear.
In at least one county, legal counsel was consulted to
determine what the LPHA had the power to do.

45 Missouri Governor Michael L. Parson. Proper mask usage may prevent close contacts from quarantining. (2020, November 12).
https://governor.mo.gov/press-releases/archive/governor-parson-announces-changes-states-k-12-school-quarantine-guidance
46 Adair County Mask Ordinance. (2020, November 23). https://adair.lphamo.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/11242020115522.pdf
47 City of Kirksville Mask Ordinance No. 12407. (2020, November 24). https://www.kirksvillecity.com/filestorage/9701/9967/16590/
Face_Covering_Ordinance_12407.pdf
48 Adair County Public Health Department. (2021, April 15). Novel coronavirus update: mask wearing is strongly recommended even
without mandate. https://adair.lphamo.org/2019-novel-coronavirus-update/
49 City of Kirksville Mask Ordinance No.12425. (2021, March 1). https://www.kirksvillecity.com/filestorage/9701/9967/16590/Ord_12425.pdf
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E. Inconsistent Data Reporting and Outdated IT Systems
Stymied Timely Decision Making

It’s a lot to do when you’re doing the contact tracing and then you’re
trying to do the [disease monitoring] … And changing and learning a
new system in the middle of a pandemic probably wasn’t the smartest
thing that we’ve ever done. Maybe we should’ve prepared a little bit
better if our system couldn’t take something like that.
— LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH STAKEHOLDER

LPHAs relied on their own systems for tracking cases
throughout the early months of the pandemic. These
systems were variable in quality and for some health
departments included paper-based files and disease
tracking methods.
State data was not always consistent with LPHAs’ data,
causing confusion among community members. The
use of antigen testing serves as a prime example. In
less-populated areas of the Northeast, antigen testing
became more popular than PCR testing because it was
less expensive and could be processed on-site within
a few hours, whereas PCR test processing could take
10-12 days. However, during the early months of the
pandemic, the state did not report antigen test results.
According to stakeholders and residents, the lower
case data reported by the state eroded public trust in
LPHAs’ more-inclusive data. A public health stakeholder
explained: “People felt like we were inflating numbers

and were trying to make it worse than it was, especially
because they had access to the state dashboard as well.”
Another noted that the disease monitoring systems were
lagging behind the virus’s spread in the community: “It’s
not hitting the system fast enough. We’re finding that
now with death certificates and things like that, too. My
numbers are off [from] what the state has.”
A number of residents said they turned to other sources
in search of more reliable data, including Matthew Holloway, a Missouri resident, who began tracking state and
county-level data with daily Facebook updates in March
of 2020.50 Several felt Holloway’s reports had the most
accurate data in the state. One participant who worked
at a local church noted she consistently used his data
over local or state data for “rubrics and decision-making
processes” for the church community: “Matthew Holloway was great. His data tracking independently was
better than anything statewide.”

50 Holloway, M. Missouri COVID-19 update. (2020). https://theholloway.wixsite.com/mholloway-covid19
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State data was not always
consistent with LPHAs’ data,
causing confusion among
community members.

In an effort to improve COVID-19 tracking and increase
the accuracy of data, the state eventually implemented
state-wide reporting systems, including EpiTrax and
MO ACTS.51 Local stakeholders, however, noted that
the implementation of these systems came late in the
response and caused frustration, as already overburdened LPHA staff had to switch gears midstream. Many
LPHAs described using and learning the systems simultaneously. One public health stakeholder from a smaller
health department described not knowing whether they
were using it correctly: “We did finally learn the new
system. However, I’m not sure that we’re all putting
in what we need to put in. I feel like most of the time,
we’re putting out fires instead of becoming proficient
in anything. Keeping track of everybody was difficult for
us … I can’t imagine what some of the larger counties
are having to deal with. However, they also get to have
staff that are designated for that, and we don’t.” Using
these new systems for contact tracing purposes became
particularly challenging in some very rural areas with
limited internet access.

Despite these challenges, the new systems created efficiencies in disease tracking efforts for some, especially
among LPHAs with limited staffing. One LPHA described
their contact tracer’s office as filled with paper files
until they were able to utilize EpiTrax. Another health
care stakeholder involved in contact tracing acknowledged the big difference between how LPHAs and the
state were reporting data a year prior to the pandemic,
describing the evolution of reporting among LPHAs
and others involved: “From paper to computer to just
pulling the data. Now they’re just pulling the COVID19 lab results by themselves, which is wonderful. It’s a
big relief.”
Multiple interviewees also noted that there were
technological barriers that hindered communication.
A stakeholder from the business sector said the state
needs to move towards modern information-sharing
services and that the modernization process needs to
be ongoing, not a one-and-done deal. Another business
stakeholder claimed that real-time information sharing
was not even an option because of how outdated certain
webpages and systems were. When stakeholders were
asked about possible recommendations and solutions
for public health moving forward, one of the most-common responses was modernizing technological services,
specifically data-sharing services and broadband internet.

    

51 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. COVID-19 technology response system. (2020). https://health.mo.gov/living/
healthcondiseases/communicable/novel-coronavirus/technology.php
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F. Trusted Information Sources Enhanced
Communication Efforts but Contended with
Rampant Misinformation
So what we tried to do is support our community, support our health department, and try to get accurate information when they needed it, but not
inundate people. Because they will shut off and they will not listen. We
talked about what we’re seeing, [the number of] people in the COVID
unit. So many deaths. By then, our community had begun to realize,
‘Oh, maybe it is real because my grandma had it or my uncle had it.
— HEALTH CARE STAKEHOLDER

LPHAs and organizations outside of public health had
a commitment to educate their communities with reliable information about ways to stay safe during the
pandemic. Several stakeholders felt that educational
campaigns were more successful when they were more
personalized, delivered by trusted community members,
and met people “where they were at.” A local health
care stakeholder spoke about the power of educational
efforts in the pandemic response, affirming that “people
feel better about getting [the vaccine] after we’ve done
some education and talked to them.”
Communication with the public about prevention strategies like mask wearing took several forms, including
billboards, newspapers, and word-of-mouth. One health
department, for instance, developed a COVID-19 public
education and information plan that utilized radio, newspaper, and regional television.
In a few counties, the education, business, and health
care sectors played important roles in developing public

COVID-19 communication campaigns and leveraging
established community partnerships and programs to
deliver messaging. For example, a hospital created a
regional partnership using CARES Act funding to bring
together 20 to 30 different groups to communicate with,
educate, and provide moral support to the public. The
partnership utilized trusted voices in the community, such
as employers and churches, in an attempt to educate
citizens without overwhelming them, tailoring their messaging “to match how it would be accepted.” In another
county, the business community ran personal-responsibility
messaging, and featured community “COVID champions”
who had played a positive role in fighting the virus.
LPHAs and health care organizations also relied on social
media to disseminate information. Several residents
identified LPHAs’ Facebook pages as an important
source of information on the pandemic. Participants
relied on them for updates on case rates, testing sites,
and information on vaccination availability and registration: “I enabled Facebook Notifications for any time
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the health department posted on Facebook. So, I was
catching almost all of their updates and in terms of
information-sharing, I think they have done a great job
and have continued [to] develop well over time.”

Misinformation and Inconsistencies
in Public Health Messaging
Stakeholders and residents, however, also noted the power
of social media and certain news sources to spread misinformation. One health department employee observed
that using Facebook to communicate information about
COVID-19 “can turn into a shouting match with some
people who think it’s all a conspiracy theory.” One resident
noted: “So much of this [the problem with misinformation]
I think is related to social media, where everybody is an
expert and people have lost the ability to discern that
epidemiologists and virologists and physicians, in general,
are people that we should be taking seriously.”
The need for consistent messaging at the state, regional,
and local levels to strengthen public health recommendations came up repeatedly in interviews and focus groups.
One resident remarked, “People don’t know why these
recommendations are … important. [The recommendations] are getting pushed out without really spending
time educating [about] them or doing the quality health
communication that needs to get done, to help people
understand why this is important. There isn’t really any
persuasive communication going on.” Some residents
also suggested that the lack of clear messaging from the
outset about the vaccine’s safety and efficacy contributed
to vaccine hesitancy in their communities. One resident
said that inconsistent messaging failures from state and
federal officials undermined local public health authority:
“Our health department and other officials locally have to
combat … conflicting information coming from elected
officials either at the state level or the national level …
You have people in really high positions going against
what scientists say, or what public health officials say,
and I can’t reconcile it in my own head.”
Confusion surrounded school mitigation strategies in
several towns. Many parents and teachers in the focus
groups were frustrated with how frequently school
COVID-19 protocols seemed to vacillate. They felt
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that this contributed to non-adherence, either through
misunderstandings or blatant disregard for seemingly
weak authority. A number of residents said a “cohesive
message” clearly explaining the risks and recommendations for school-aged children would have helped.
A teacher in the focus groups noted, “It was ugly a lot
of the time at school this year … We’ve gone through
so many variations of what our criteria was going to be
for whether we went completely online or whether we
stayed at hybrid or whether we went back full-time in
person. If there had been some very clear direction, it
would have made that time period easier.”

Valuable Lessons Learned for Earning
Public Trust
The majority of residents trusted their local public health
officials and were more likely to rely on them for information about the pandemic than the state’s health
department. Over half of participants could identify
their local public health department director by name,
while only a few could name the state director. Many
residents said their confidence in LPHAs’ messaging was
higher when officials cited the science in their recommendations and were transparent about what they did
not know. Others said strong leadership and visibility
were critical to instilling trust and confidence. Having
a presence in the community prior to the pandemic
through services like flu vaccine clinics also appeared to
increase residents’ confidence in their health department
as a trusted source of public health information.
Several residents felt that LPHAs that did not engage
in the political back and forth associated with the pandemic were more successful at communicating public
health messages. These agencies focused on science
and the data in their updates, rather than engage in
political debate. Some said that local endorsements from
well-respected community members lent credibility to
public health messaging coming from local public health
departments. As one resident explained, “I think in these
small towns whenever you can get somebody who is a
figurehead in the community to get behind something,
I think that’s really helpful.”
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G. The Public Health Response Did Not Sufficiently
Meet the Needs of Older Adults and Individuals Living
in Poverty
There’s a disparity, of course, with individuals with resources being able
to have access to the vaccine while seniors and individuals that do not
have resources are not able to have the vaccine.
— COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION STAKEHOLDER

People of advanced age and those with low incomes
faced particular issues when accessing essential public
health services. In the Northeast region 14 out of 16
counties exceeded the state’s average poverty rate of
12.9% — in many cases, by several percentage points.52
Older adults make up 17%53 of the population in Missouri,
but in the Northeast older adults make up about 20%
of the population in several counties.54

this issue, noting that they had heard “horror stories”
about the challenges of registering online and how it
impacted low-income and older individuals. As one resident pointed out, “The more-vulnerable people … don’t
have the capacity to do it online.” A stakeholder from a
community organization emphasized that “[even] being
able to … utilize the phone system to get signed up” was
a barrier for some older individuals.

Older individuals and those living in poverty were disproportionately affected by a lack of access to computers,
broadband, and internet, which impeded their ability
to learn about and register for services like testing and
vaccination. Because vaccine registration was predominantly done through online platforms, some health care
stakeholders feared that, early in the vaccine rollout,
“people who are more tech savvy” were leapfrogging
older, less-technology-adept individuals who were at
higher risk. Residents in one focus group also raised

Multiple stakeholders also discussed the need for
targeted services for individuals without accessible
transportation, including older adults and homebound
populations. A health care stakeholder referred to transportation as one of the “social barriers and … detriments
to care” most seriously impacting older adults. In some
cases, hospitals and LPHAs assisted in the registration
and transportation process. One hospital worked with
local social service agencies to offer a vaccine clinic near
a shuttle line in an attempt to reach residents who rely on

52 Missouri Census Data Center. Missouri county fact sheets. (2020). https://mcdc.missouri.edu/applications/MO-county-factsheets/
53 United States Census Bureau. Quick facts: Missouri. (2020). https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/MO
54 Missouri Census Data Center. Missouri county fact sheets. (2020). https://mcdc.missouri.edu/applications/MO-county-factsheets/
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public transportation. An LPHA in another county established a similar partnership with a regional transportation
service to bring older individuals to a central location
where they could receive the vaccine. One community
organization in the region worked specifically with older
adults living in low-income housing to assist them with
vaccine scheduling and registration. A stakeholder from
that community organization recalled, “I went to two
low-income housing projects here in town for seniors
… I was in their lobby for two hours scheduling time for
seniors to get signed up to get their vaccination.”
The cost of testing was a major financial barrier that put
testing out of reach for many people with limited incomes.
In the early stages of the testing rollout, free community
testing was not readily available in many areas of the
region. Rapid tests were more likely to be available
in more rural areas; however, they were less accurate
and therefore not trusted by some. One stakeholder
reported that the more-accurate PCR test cost around
$100.00. Another stakeholder, from the education sector,
said that, “a lot of people weren’t willing to be tested
because it cost money.”
Some stakeholders also discussed the struggles that
low-income students faced when primary and secondary
schools in the region transitioned to remote schooling
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The cost of testing was a major
financial barrier that put testing
out of reach for many people with
limited incomes.

during the early phases of the pandemic. In some of
these cases, students in low-income households were
expected to purchase necessary technology in order to
participate in online learning. One stakeholder from the
education sector expressed concern that the school did
not have enough technological supplies to support these
students. Other education stakeholders recalled telling
their local public health departments that students in the
most-rural counties would be disadvantaged by virtual
learning, as internet access and reliability greatly varied.
A local public health official stated, “I worry about the
majority of the kids that don’t have that support system
on a normal day, much less with a tablet and a keyboard
and they’ve got to Zoom-meet every morning.”
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H. Public Health Messaging Was Not Tailored to Latino,
Black, and Immigrant Communities
Across Missouri, people of color were disproportionately
impacted by COVID-19. Despite being 11% of Missouri’s
population, Black people made up 35% of COVID-19
cases and 14% of deaths.55,56 Latino people are 4% of
the population but made up 13% of COVID-19 cases
and 3% of deaths.57,58 A handful of residents, who work
with community- and faith-based organizations serving
immigrant communities, raised concerns about this disproportionate impact. These residents emphasized the
missed opportunity of tailoring communication to various
cultures and languages. In one focus group, residents
discussed a recent outbreak in the local Congolese
community and suggested that information had not
been adequately targeted to that community and had
not been translated into French. One resident said, “The
main thing for us was the language barrier. Like, a lot of
[people in the Congolese community] don’t understand
English, and vice versa — I don’t speak very good French.”

Another resident said that this problem had also emerged
for the Hispanic/Latino community in the area. They
also noted that getting enough interpreters had been
challenging given the need to continually translate and
update information about the ever-evolving pandemic.
A stakeholder from a community organization feared
that insufficiently targeted messaging to Black, Latino,
and immigrant community members would result in
disparities in vaccination rates. The same stakeholder
noted that communication strategies failed to take into
account structural racism, specifically for Black community members who already experience high levels of
“fear and distrust” of the health system.

55 Kaiser Family Foundation. COVID-19 cases by race/ethnicity. (2021). https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/covid-19-cases-by-race-ethnicity/?currentTimeframe=0&selectedRows=%7B%22states%22:%7B%22missouri%22:%7B%7D%7D%7D&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22White%20%25%20of%20Cases%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
56 The COVID Tracking Project. Missouri: all race and ethnicity data. (2021). https://covidtracking.com/data/state/missouri/race-ethnicity
57 Kaiser Family Foundation. COVID-19 cases by race/ethnicity. (2021). https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/covid-19-cases-by-race-ethnicity/?currentTimeframe=0&selectedRows=%7B%22states%22:%7B%22missouri%22:%7B%7D%7D%7D&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22White%20%25%20of%20Cases%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
58 The COVID Tracking Project. Missouri: all race and ethnicity data. (2021). https://covidtracking.com/data/state/missouri/race-ethnicity
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Key Recommendations:
Strengthening the Public
Health Response to COVID-19
and Future Crises in
Northeast Missouri
The infusion of new federal dollars into Missouri has the potential to bring
more money to the state’s public health infrastructure than ever before.
Our hope is that these findings will be leveraged for the purpose of
strengthening the public health system’s ability to continue to respond to
the COVID-19 pandemic and to face future crises with greater resources
coordination, equitable strategies, modernized infrastructure, and public
trust. Specific recommendations for advancing this vision are detailed in
our report Missouri’s Public Health Response to COVID-19: Key Findings
and Recommendations for State Action and Investment.59

59 Levi, J., Regenstein, M., Hughes, D., Trott, J., Markus, A., Seyoum, S., Acosta, A.,
Benoit, M., Van Bronkhorst, H., Conway, C. “Missouri’s Public Health Response to
COVID-19: Key Findings and Recommendations for State Action and Investment”.
(September 2021). Health Policy and Management Issue Briefs. Paper 61. https://
hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_policy_briefs/61

TABLE 1. MISSOURI’S PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO COVID-19: KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
STRENGTHENING PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE IN MISSOURI

Recommendation

The State of Missouri Should:

1

Provide financial support
and technical assistance for
public health accreditation.

Create a special fund to provide technical assistance for LPHAs to assess
readiness for accreditation via the Public Health Accreditation Board, identify
costs to close gaps, and cover fees associated with the accreditation application
process.

2

Prioritize equity.

Expand funding, staff, and other supports to help LPHAs integrate equity
principles into data collection and reporting and community engagement (i.e.,
trust building, links to social services). Increase workforce and funding for the
Office of Minority Health.

3

Build a modernized
surveillance system.

Build a modernized system and provide LPHAs or regional bodies with hardware
and software to manage the system, consistent with federal standards.

4

Create regional
coordinating bodies.

Incentivize and support greater formal sharing of staffing and services
among smaller LPHAs, with a lead public health agency designated to convene
and coordinate, designed to develop and strengthen all foundational public
health capabilities.

5

Bolster the public
health workforce.

Support workforce development through equitable recruiting, hiring, and
promotion practices; new training programs; enhanced salaries for LPHA leaders
with advanced training; and deploy skilled staff within regions.

6

Ensure equitable
public health funding
across the state.

Provide a minimum level of funding for LPHAs, linked to delivery of foundational
public health services and an equity analysis incorporating social vulnerability, and
ensure that public health money flows directly to LPHAs.

7

Clarify LPHA governance
structure and authorities.

Commission legal analysis to create greater consistency in decision making and
oversight across LPHA governance and financing.

8

Harmonize policy
development.

Ensure consistent policies across jurisdictions for public health prevention
and mitigation measures. DHSS should establish and adhere to protocols for
consultation with LPHAs on new policies during emergencies.

SOURCE: Levi, J., Regenstein, M., Hughes, D., Trott, J., Markus, A., Seyoum, S., Acosta, A., Benoit, M., Van Bronkhorst, H.,
Conway, C. “Missouri’s Public Health Response to COVID-19: Key Findings and Recommendations for State Action and
Investment”. (September 2021). Health Policy and Management Issue Briefs. Paper 61. https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/
sphhs_policy_briefs/61
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Appendix A: Methods
and Data Sources
Stakeholder Interviews
This project employed a mixed-methods, qualitative comparative case study approach to conduct an evaluation
of the public health response to COVID-19 in Missouri.
The findings in this report come principally from interviews with stakeholders. A total of 131 stakeholders from
state and local public health departments, elected and
other government officials, health care organizations,
educational institutions, the business community, faithbased organizations, membership associations, and a
variety of social support services and other non-profits
were interviewed virtually from October 2020 to May
2021. Twenty-five of these interviews were conducted in
the Northeast region (Table A). Interviews were supplemented by media accounts and other publicly available
data sources, as well as focus groups with 56 residents
in the region (Table B).
A purposeful sample of stakeholders was recruited in a
mix of counties throughout Northeast Missouri (Table
A) to reflect variation in experiences with public health
practice, local governmental processes and structures,
and potential opportunities for strengthening public
health statewide. Participants were recruited through
snowball sampling, reviews of media reports, and general
research techniques. All interviewees were promised
confidentiality. Interview questions came from guides
developed by GW for this study and customized to the
sector represented by the interviewee. In the vast majority of cases, each interview consisted of one individual
stakeholder and two GW study members. Interviewees
did not receive compensation for their participation.

Interviews were audio-recorded with permission and then
transcribed. Alternatively, careful note-taking was used
when interviewees did not consent to audio-recording.
All of the transcripts and notes were coded using the
Dedoose qualitative software platform and following
standard protocols for building a codebook and applying
the codes to transcripts. Each interview transcript was
coded by two or more GW study team members. Coded
interview excerpts were reviewed for common themes,
both within and across geographic regions. Themes were
identified based on a variety of rationales, including the
frequency with which they were mentioned in different
transcripts and regions, the emphasis with which they
were presented, and consensus amongst different GW
study team members.
The selection of regions for in-depth analysis was
informed by the Missouri State Emergency Management
System (SEMA) division of the state into nine distinct
regions (A-I), which are each affiliated with a Highway
Patrol Troop. Highway Region B consists of 16 counties
located in the Northeast corner of Missouri (see Figure
2). These counties include: Adair, Chariton, Clark, Knox,
Lewis, Linn, Macon, Marion, Monroe, Putnam, Ralls,
Randolph, Schuyler, Scotland, Shelby, and Sullivan.60
Interviews were conducted with stakeholders from 6
different sectors in Northeast Missouri’s Highway Region
B (Table A).

60 Missouri Department of Public Safety SEMA. State regional coordinators program. https://sema.dps.mo.gov/programs/area_coordinator.php
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TABLE A. INTERVIEWS IN NORTHEAST MISSOURI (OCTOBER 2020 – APRIL 2021)
Sector

Who is Included?

Number of Interviews

Business

Chamber of commerce, business councils, economic groups

3

Community/Faith
Organizations

Non-profits, for-profits, health networks, community
partnerships, social services, churches, faith-based social
service organizations

2

Education

K-12, higher education, and education-focused entities

6

Health Care

Hospitals and health centers, health care associations, longterm care facilities, and behavioral health

6

Policy

Government entities (city, county)

1

Public Health

Emergency management, LPHAs, research, and other public
health-focused organizations

7

Total

25

Quotes were selected from transcribed interviews in the
region and were condensed, abbreviated, or minorly
redacted to protect confidentiality and clarify phrases in
the event that the transcription service made errors or if the
interviewees repeated themselves or added filler words
(e.g., “um”) that distracted from their overall statements.

Focus Groups with Residents
We also held 11 focus groups and two one-on-one
interviews with a total of 56 participants, all of whom
resided in the Northeast region. We recruited participants
through community-based organizations and leaders,
faith-based institutions, local public health forums, such
as COVID-19-related Facebook groups, and other community coalitions.
Our focus group sample comprises self-selected participants, who take the pandemic very seriously. In line with the
convention of purposeful sampling in qualitative evaluations,
this sample provides us with an intentionally well-informed group of participants, who have thoughtful and
reasoned input on the public health response in Missouri.

While we appreciate participation from a more representative population of residents would have given
us perspective on those with whom the public health
response struggled to engage, we believe our sample
provides a more useful and accurate assessment of how
the public health response unfolded, how it was interpreted by those who understood its importance, and how
the social and political context in the state impacted it.
We collected socio-demographic information from participants using a screening survey disseminated prior to
the focus groups. Participants also provided information
on COVID-19-related questions, including whether they
had ever tested positive for COVID-19 and their vaccination status. During the focus groups, we also collected
information from participants using Google polls. These
polls focused on topics related to the public health
response and asked participants to reflect on specific
guidelines, including those recommended by the CDC;
identify sources of information they use to get updates
on the pandemic; and report their level of confidence
in local public health officials.
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All focus groups were conducted via Zoom and participants were invited to contribute through oral discussion
or written comments using the chat function. Focus
groups were recorded and transcribed for accuracy. Study
members analyzed transcripts and chat records using
NVivo software and examined key themes that emerged
during the discussions. Themes were identified based on
the frequency and intensity with which participants discussed an issue both across and within groups. Poll data
were also analyzed to triangulate themes that emerged in
the groups. Focus group participants received gift cards
to Amazon or local stores in appreciation of their time.

Socio-Demographics of Focus Group
Participants
While the majority of participants in the focus groups
lived in Adair County, we also had residents participate from Randolph, Macon, Knox, Ralls, and Putnam
Counties. The vast majority (86%) of participants were
female and a majority (59%) were below the age of 50.
Almost all of the participants (93%) identified as White,
2% identified as Black, 4% identified as Asian or Asian
American, and 2% identified as Middle Eastern.
Half of respondents (50%) had completed either some
college/two-year degree or four years of college, and
45% had earned a graduate degree. Most (71%) had a
household income of less than $99,000. Those participating in focus groups had a variety of employment
situations. Most (66%) reported they worked as paid
employees, and a small percentage (14%) said they
were retired. Another 14% reported not working at
the time of the focus group. Most participants lived in
rural communities, with 82% reporting they lived in a
non-metro area with a population of less than 20,000
people. More information about the northeast focus
group participants can be found in Table B.
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TABLE B. NORTHEAST FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS
Number of Respondents

56

Age

Respondents
(% of total)

Language

Respondents
(% of total)

21-29

6 (11%)

Speaking a language other than
English at home, N (%)

1 (2%)

30-39

12 (21%)

40-49

15 (27%)

50-59

11 (20%)

Highest Grade Level/
School

Respondents
(% of total)

60-69

7 (13%)

Some high school, but did not
graduate

0 (0%)

70+

5 (9%)

High school degree or GED

3 (5%)

Some college or 2-year degree

12 (21%)

4-year college graduate

16 (29%)

Gender

Respondents
(% of total)

N (%) female

48 (86%)

Graduate school degree

25 (45%)

Identify as Transgender

2 (3.6%)

Other/prefer not to answer

0 (0%)

Race/Ethnicity

Respondents
(% of total)

Income

Respondents
(% of total)

White

52 (93%)

Less than $49,999

19 (34%)

Black

1 (2%)

Between $50,000-$99,999

21 (37%)

Other

3 (5%)

Between $100,000-$149,000

14 (25%)

Above $150,000

2 (4%)

Other/prefer not to answer

0 (0%)

Identify as Hispanic/Latino

Respondents
(% of total)

N (%)

0 (0%)
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TABLE B. NORTHEAST FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS (CONTINUED)
Number of Respondents

56

Employment Status

Respondents
(% of total)

Urban-Rural Makeup

Working (as paid employee)

37 (66%)

City/Metro Area with a Population
of 250,000 or more people

0 (0%)

Self-employed

3 (5%)

Retired

8 (14%)

City/Metro Area with a Population
of 50,000 to 250,000 people

0 (0%)

Not working*

8 (14%)

City/Metro Area with a Population
of 20,000 to 49,000 people

10 (18%)

Non-Metro Area
(population of ≤ 20,000)

46 (82%)

Other/prefer not to answer

0 (0%)

*Category includes those that are unemployed, students, and
those with disabilities which prevent them from working

Respondents
(% of total)

Public Health Infrastructure and Demographics in Northeast Missouri
TABLE C. PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEMOGRAPHICS IN NORTHEAST MISSOURI

County

Population61

Racial & Ethnic Composition62

Persons
living below LPHA
poverty (%)63 Governance64

Per Capita
Public
Health
Revenue65

Adair
County

25,314

White: 89.4%; Black: 3.4%;
AI/AN: 0.4%; Asian or PI: 2.7%;
Multiracial: 2.0%; Hispanic: 2.6%

19.2%

Board of Trustees

$40.51

Chariton
County

7,408

White: 94.8%; Black: 2.4%;
AI or AN: 0.5%; Asian or PI: 0.3%;
Multiracial: 1.3%; Hispanic: 0.9%

12.5%

Board of Trustees

$51.97

Clark
County

6,634

White: 96.8%; Black: 0.4%;
AI or AN: 0.2%; Asian or PI: 0.4%;
Multiracial: 1.3%; Hispanic: 0.9%

14.2%

Board of Trustees

$43.83
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County

Population61

Racial & Ethnic Composition62

Persons
living below LPHA
poverty (%)63 Governance64

Per Capita
Public
Health
Revenue65

Knox
County

3,744

White: 95.5%; Black: 0.6%;
AI or AN: 0.6%; Asian or PI: 0.4%;
Multiracial: 1.7%; Hispanic: 1.4%

16.7%

Board of Trustees

$73.40

Lewis
County

10,032

White: 92.5%; Black: 3.2%;
AI or AN: 0.5%; Asian or PI: 0.5%;
Multiracial: 1.7%; Hispanic: 1.9%

16.6%

Board of Trustees

$132.44

Linn
County

11,874

White: 94.2%; Black: 0.0%;
AI or AN: 0.4%; Asian or PI: 0.4%;
Multiracial: 1.7%; Hispanic: 2.8%

18.9%

Board of Trustees

$52.63

Macon
County

15,209

White: 93.1%; Black: 2.5%;
AI or AN: 0.4%; Asian or PI: 0.7%;
Multiracial: 1.9%; Hispanic: 1.8%

12.5%

Board of Trustees

$48.82

Marion
County

28,525

White:90.0%; Black: 5.0%;
AI or AN: 0.3%; Asian or PI: 0.8%;
Multiracial: 2.5%; Hispanic: 1.9%

13.9%

Board of Trustees

$33.66

Monroe
County

8,666

White: 92.5%; Black: 2.9%;
AI or AN: 0.6%; Asian or PI: 0.4%;
Multiracial: 2.1%; Hispanic: 1.7%

13.4%

Board of Trustees

$38.62

Putnam
County

4,681

White: 95.3%; Black: 0.3%;
AI or AN: 0.3%; Asian or PI: 0.5%;
Multiracial: 1.3%; Hispanic: 2.5%

15.7%

Board of Trustees

$82.64

Ralls
County

10,355

White: 95.2%; Black: 1.4%;
AI or AN: 0.2%; Asian or PI: 0.4%;
Multiracial: 1.5%; Hispanic: 1.3%

10.0%

Board of Trustees

$49.89

Randolph
County

24,716

White: 88.8%; Black: 5.6%;
AI or AN: 0.6%; Asian or PI: 0.8%;
Multiracial: 2.5%; Hispanic: 2.2%

16.5%

Board of Trustees

$51.64

Schuyler
County

4,032

White: 96.4%; Black: 0.1%;
AI or AN: 0.4%; Asian or PI: 0.3%;
Multiracial: 1.2%; Hispanic: 1.7%

20.8%

Board of Trustees

$67.76

Scotland
County

4,716

White: 97.1%; Black: 0.1%;
AI or AN: 0.3%; Asian or PI: 0.2%;
Multiracial: 1.2%; Hispanic: 1.1%

14.4%

Board of Trustees

$51.78
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County

Population61

Racial & Ethnic Composition62

Persons
living below LPHA
poverty (%)63 Governance64

Per Capita
Public
Health
Revenue65

Shelby
County

6,103

White: 95.1%; Black: 0.9%;
AI or AN: 0.4%; Asian or PI: 0.2%;
Multiracial: 1.5%; Hispanic: 2.2%

15.8%

Board of Trustees

$76.50

Sullivan
County

5,999

White: 76.7%; Black: 3.2%;
AI or AN: 1.4%; Asian or PI: 1.1%;
Multiracial: 1.1%; Hispanic: 18.6%

15.6%

Board of Trustees

$60.65

* MICH Accreditation,66 + PHAB Accreditation67

61 62 63 64 65 66 N67

61 United States Census Bureau. Quick Facts. (2020). https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219
62 United States Census Bureau. Quick Facts. (2020). https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219
63 United States Census Bureau. Quick Facts. (2020). https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219
64 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Public health works: a web-based orientation manual for public health leaders.
(March 2019). https://health.mo.gov/living/lpha/phworks/publichealthworks.pdf
65 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Revenue Sources for Local Public Health Agencies. (2018). https://health.
mo.gov/living/lpha/review18/Table_Contents.php
66 Missouri Institute for Community Health. Accredited Agencies in Missouri. https://michweb.org/accredited-agencies-in-missouri/
67 Public Health Accreditation Board. Complete List of Nationally Accredited Health Departments, Missouri. (2021, August 24).
https://phaboard.org/who-is-accredited/
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